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Singapore is one of the most open economies in the world. Given its deep and extensive 
integration with international markets, the economy was significantly hit by the global 
financial crisis.  
Chart 1 
Transmission of global financial shock to Singapore 
 
There are three broad channels through which the financial crisis and the attendant squeeze 
in liquidity and credit have impinged on domestic economic activity. 
Immediate channel: the impact from the shock was most immediately felt via a pullback in 
the sentiment-sensitive segments of the financial sector, such as stock broking and wealth 
advisory. 
Direct channel: the weakening in consumer sentiment had a direct bearing on domestic-
oriented activities, such as retail trade and the property market.  
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 Indirect channel: in an open economy, the repercussions on the external-oriented sectors 
also came indirectly as external economies contracted. Sagging foreign demand affected 
industries such as manufacturing, transport-hub and tourism services. In turn, companies 
cutting back on investment, jobs and wages further dampened consumer sentiment and 












































As of Q1 this year, GDP had already fallen by about 10% from its peak. In Q2, some of the 
previous output losses were reversed, bringing economic activity to levels last seen in 
H1 2007, resulting in a switch from contraction to stabilisation. However, the next shift to a 
sustained expansion mode is not expected to be very sharp. A strong once-and-for-all 
decisive upturn is not expected at this stage. For 2009 as a whole, GDP is expected to 
contract by 4-6%.  
Chart 3 shows that external demand as a share of total demand has increased over the past 
decade. The Singapore economy has been highly vulnerable to global headwinds, and the 
recovery path will be heavily predicated on external departments. A decisive recovery will not 
be possible if global and regional demand does not improve.  
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 Chart 3 
GDP growth & external demand 
 
Note: 2009 numbers are consensus forecasts. 
2.  Government responses to the crisis 
While Singapore cannot be insulated from the global financial crisis given the openness of 
the economy, it is crucial to ensure the soundness of the financial institutions and stability of 
financial markets, as well as maintain the confidence of investors. There is also a need to put 
in place appropriate macroeconomic policy settings.  
The Singapore economy is currently facing an aggregate demand shock on a global scale, 
not an erosion of Singapore’s competitiveness. Against this backdrop, it is not the aim of 
fiscal measures to fill in the economy’s output gap. Instead, the aim is to facilitate cost 
adjustments in the business sector and provide supplements to household income where 
needed, to help businesses and households cope with the downturn and adjust to this new 
reality.  
The assessment has been that fiscal policy is most effective in this situation, and should 
therefore take on the greater part of the adjustment burden in the overall macro policy 
stance, while monetary policy maintains its focus on its anchor of stability role. The 
government budget was brought forward by a month to January this year and is a substantial 
package, amounting to 8.2% of GDP. It contains a diversified suite of targeted measures with 
multiple impact points for workers, households and businesses.  
In the financial sector space, immediately following the Lehman collapse, the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS) put in place measures to instill market confidence and ensure 
the stability of the financial system. Ample liquidity was kept in the system and the Standing 
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 also collaborative efforts to ensure adequate US dollar liquidity in the system by establishing 
necessary arrangements with the US Federal Reserve. In addition, regulation of financial 
institutions was enhanced and internal macroprudential assessment stepped up through 
high-frequency macroprudential surveillance meetings.  
In addition, MAS made monetary policy adjustments with policy actions underpinned by the 
objective of maintaining price stability over the medium term and confidence in the Singapore 
dollar (Singapore dollar).  
The following paragraphs elaborate on some of these policy measures.  
2.1  Business financing schemes 
As part of the S$20.5 billion Resilience Package announced, S$5.8 billion was set aside for 
the purpose of stimulating bank lending. With the decline in credit arising from the crisis, 
there was a need to help good and viable companies obtain funding to enable them to stay 
afloat and grow.  
To address this, the government decided to take on a significant share of the risks of bank 
lending and extend support to a broader segment of the credit market beyond SMEs. This 
support comes in the form of enhancements to existing bank lending schemes and the 
Special Risk-Sharing Initiative (SRI).  
The two components are set out in Table 1. Key enhancements include broadening the 
scope of eligible companies, increasing the government’s share of default risk and increasing 
the maximum loan quantum. It is important to note that while the government is taking on a 
significant share of the risks of bank lending, the lending business and credit decisions 
remain with the banks, which have the direct relationships with customers and expertise in 
credit assessment.  
 
Table 1 
Special risk sharing initiative 
Scheme Description 
New bridging loan 
programme 
  For local companies and foreign SMEs 
  Maximum loan quantum increased from S$500,000 to S$5 million 
  Government default risk sharing increased from 50% to 80% 
Trade Financing    Domestic facilities: companies with at least 30% local shareholding 
  Export facilities: companies incorporated in Singapore with at least 
3 strategic business functions in Singapore 
  Government co-shares 75% of default risk 
  Maximum loan quantum of up to S$15 million per borrower group 
 
Chart 4 provides an illustration of the new Bridging Loan Programme (BLP), which has been 
substantially enhanced from the scheme introduced in November. The new BLP caters to 
loans of up to S$5 million, up from S$500,000 currently, and meets the working capital needs 
of most mid-sized firms and some of the larger ones. The government’s share of risk on 
these loans has been raised from 50% to 80%. Further, the new BLP enables banks to set 
their own interest rates, allowing higher-risk borrowers to gain access to credit, even if it is at 
a higher interest rate.  
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 Chart 4 
Bridging Loan Programme 
 
While it may be too early to assess the effectiveness of these schemes, the number of 
government-backed loans has increased significantly following their introduction. 
2.2 Deposit  guarantee 
In October last year, the Singapore Government announced a blanket guarantee on all 
deposits in banks, finance companies and merchant banks licensed by the MAS. These 
include deposits with overseas branches of the local banks that fall under the Singapore 
legal entity. All Singapore dollar and foreign currency deposits of individuals and corporates 
are covered.  
This is an extension of the deposit insurance scheme administered by the Singapore Deposit 
Insurance Corporation. While the banking system was, and continues to be, sound and 
resilient, this was a precautionary move taken to guard against erosion of banks’ deposit 
base.  
3. Enhancing  market  resilience 
3.1  Money market and liquidity management 
Singapore was not immune to the effects of global deleveraging in the aftermath of the 
Lehman collapse. Tighter credit conditions in the Asian dollar market inevitably spilled over 
into local currency money markets in Asia. Chart 5 shows the impact of higher US dollar 
borrowing rates on the Singapore dollar market in September 2008. 
To ease pressure in the Singapore dollar money market, MAS kept a higher level of liquidity 
in the banking system through its market operations and enhanced its monitoring of market 
functionality through closer contact with financial institutions. MAS also reassured financial 
institutions that it would continue to anticipate the market’s funding needs and would 
consider the unique liquidity needs of individual banks on a case-by-case basis. 
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 Chart 5 
Impact of US dollar borrowing rates on Singapore dollar rates 
3.1.1  Enhancements to MAS standing facility 
MAS also introduced enhancements to the MAS Standing Facility, which has been a key 
channel through which MAS provides liquidity to financial institutions. In line with major 
central banks and recommendations by the Financial Stability Forum, the pool of eligible 
counterparties and collateral was expanded in July 2008 to help financial institutions 
operating in Singapore to better manage their risk and liquidity and provide them with greater 
access to Singapore dollar liquidity.  
Even prior to opening up participation in the Standing Facility to all RTGS members, the 
facility had already covered 80% of the market through the eleven Primary Dealers. The 
expansion of the Standing Facility has increased market efficiency by shortening the path 
through which Singapore dollar liquidity reaches non-Primary Dealer banks from MAS and 
vice versa.  
The pool of eligible collateral was expanded in July 2009 to include AAA-rated Singapore 
dollar debt securities issued by sovereigns, supranationals and sovereign-backed 
corporates. The MAS has also started the process of entering into cross-border collateral 
arrangements with major central banks to accept well-rated foreign currencies and 
government debt securities as collateral.  
3.1.2  Cross-border collateralisation arrangements 
Under these cross-border collateralisation arrangements, banks operating in Singapore are 
able to tap on MAS for Singapore dollar liquidity by placing foreign currency cash and 
securities in MAS account facilities with a correspondent central bank via either a swap, repo 
or under pledge (and vice versa). The MAS has signed an MOU with the Dutch Central Bank 
and discussions are ongoing with several other central banks to establish similar 
arrangements. Singapore’s cross-border collaboration efforts on the liquidity front go beyond 
the establishment of such arrangements.  
3.1.3  US federal reserve swap line 
In line with global US dollar interbank markets, banks in Singapore faced some US dollar 
funding pressures following the onset of the crisis. In an effort to ease these pressures, MAS 
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 October. This was a precautionary measure to boost market confidence by reassuring 
financial institutions in Singapore, many of which have international operations, that they 
would have access to US dollar liquidity amidst the global US dollar funding shortage.  
Under the arrangement, the Federal Reserve committed up to US$30 billion, to be made 
available at MAS’ request, and each swap between MAS and the Federal Reserve can be for 
up to 84 days. The arrangement was extended further in June and is now valid until 
1 February 2010.  
This has helped to enhance the robustness of the US dollar funding and foreign exchange 
markets in Singapore. MAS has not needed to draw on the swap facility as money markets 
remained relatively orderly.  
3.1.4  Enhancing the resilience of Singapore government securities 
With the rise in government bond issuance globally as governments broadened fiscal 
measures and banks’ balance sheets shrank, the volatility in government bond markets has 
risen with the unfolding of the financial crisis. The rising supply risks and deteriorating 
financial sector conditions have led to volatile government bond yields and poor government 
bond primary auctions.  
Singapore is unique, and privileged, as the government issues bonds for the sole purpose of 
building a risk-free yield curve for the corporate sector to price its debt and not to finance any 
budget deficit. However, the Singapore Government Securities (SGS) market can be affected 
by weak sentiment spilling over from other markets. While there is very limited risk of an 
uncovered auction occurring, since SGS primary dealers are obliged to underwrite auctions 
fully, there remains the risk that unexpected changes in financial market conditions on the 
day of SGS auctions may result in unexpectedly skewed auction results. This risk has 
increased as global market volatility has risen and banks’ balance sheets come under strain.  
A skewed auction result would be detrimental to a market that is already volatile. The effects 
of a poor auction with an unusually high cut-off yield could include an upward shift in the 
entire yield curve, the marking down of banks’ SGS portfolios and a knock-on repricing of 
Singapore dollar-denominated debt. Any or all of these would hurt investor confidence and 
impinge on Singapore dollar-denominated debt as a reliable investment class. The effects 
could be prolonged and perpetuate higher yields for future bond auctions in all tenors.  
As such, pre-emptive safeguards were put in place to strengthen the SGS market’s resilience 
and reduce the risk of outlandish and disruptive auction results, where yields cut off either 
well above or well below prevailing market yields. Under the safeguards, MAS is empowered 
to vary its subscription amount if the auction cut-off yield falls outside a 25 basis point 
corridor around the prevailing market yield at each auction. This mitigates the risk of 
disorderly trading in specific securities or volatility in the secondary market. It is noteworthy 
that while the yield corridor of ±25bps is set in advance, the reference rate (ie. prevailing 
yield that serves as mid-point) is determined by the market. This is important as MAS does 
not have an interest rate policy framework and does not take a view on rates.  
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 4. Monetary  policy 
Chart 6 
Monetary policy profile 
 
Chart 6 shows Singapore’s exchange rate, GDP growth with inflation and monetary policy 
responses since 2004. A calibrated and moderated response to the global inflation and 
demand shock has been taken, and is guided by a number of factors, including: 
1.  External-demand-drive nature of the shock;  
2.  Medium-term objective of maintaining price stability;  
3.  Need to ensure that the Singapore dollar remains an anchor of stability.  
MAS’ monetary policy has focused on medium-term price stability. Chart 7 shows the results 
of counterfactual simulations if a more vigorous response to commodity price inflation had 
been adopted in 2007.  
First, the tighter policy would not have had an immediate impact on the high inflation rates. 
Second, the abrupt and significant strengthening in the exchange rate would have led to a 
sudden loss in competitiveness, leaving the economy vulnerable to an unanticipated sharp 
decline in external demand in the latter half of 2008. Under the tighter policy, GDP growth 
would have come in lower at 0.6% in 2008, compared to 1.1% in the actual outcome. Third, if 
the tighter policy had been reversed in Oct 2008, the macroeconomic outcome in 2009 would 
have been similar to that under the actual policy.  
Based on this understanding, a drastic easing in policy stance would have been required to 
offset the effects of the tighter policy. However, such a policy reversal could have tarnished 
the credibility of MAS and affected investors’ confidence in the Singapore dollar. Domestic 
interest rates could have risen sharply, partially offsetting the initial stimulus from a weaker 
exchange rate.  
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 Chart 7 
Simulated impact of tighter policy to 2007 commodity price inflation 
 
In conclusion, if policy had been further tightened in response to the inflation threats, the 
policy setting could have become inappropriate with the subsequent onset of the global 
economic downturn, given the inherent lags in monetary policy transmission.  
4.1  Pillars of monetary policy 
MAS’ response to this crisis has shown the relevance of several principles that serve as 
pillars of monetary policy:  
1.  medium-term orientation on price stability – a medium-term orientation on price 
stability means that policy direction is not changed each time there is a fluctuation in 
business activity, to avoid introducing unnecessary volatility. 
2.  Singapore dollar as anchor of stability – this ensures that the Singapore dollar 
remains an anchor of stability for Singapore’s small and open economy.  
3.  maintain confidence in Singapore dollar – in times of volatility in the financial 
markets, it is important to maintain confidence in the Singapore dollar. 
4.  understanding economic realities – policy has to be anchored in an understanding of 
the underlying realities behind economic shifts, and on what monetary policy can 
influence and what it cannot.  
5.  limited role in demand management – monetary policy plays a limited role in 
aggregate demand management. Internal estimates show that Singapore’s exports 
are significantly more responsive to income effects than price effects. While 
depreciation may provide a short-term buffer for domestic firms facing cash flow 
problems, it would at the same time increase their costs of production. 
6.  does not work in a vacuum – lastly, monetary policy does not work in a vacuum. 
Policymakers continue to ensure that the macroeconomic response from fiscal and 
monetary policy is complementary and supports the economy.  
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5. Challenges  ahead 
Looking ahead, as policies that will continue to ensure a stable and conducive business and 
financial environment are reviewed, broad structural shifts in the economic landscape and 
the challenges presented by globalisation have to be taken into account.  
Global trade flows have steadily trended upwards in the last 140 years, accelerating further 
since the 1950s. Meanwhile, capital flows have surged even more rapidly after the 1980s, 
although accompanied by frequent sharp reversals, reflecting the pernicious effects of 
financial crises.  
Indeed, this financial crisis has highlighted the tighter links that have developed between 
emerging market economies and the global financial system over the past decade, as a 
result of globalisation and greater capital flows. While greater diversification of funding 
sources should have made emerging markets more resilient to some shocks, the greater 
integration can also transmit severe global shocks further and faster.  
At the global level, this suggests the need for further research to understand the financial 
linkages between, as well as within, different financial systems. It also points to the need to 
develop toolkits to help identify potential imbalances or asset bubbles at an early stage, as 
well as research on appropriate policy responses.  
For emerging markets, greater financial integration has led to higher and more volatile capital 
flows. Going forward, further consideration may need to be given to how policy should 
respond to these flows. For example, volatile capital flows can induce volatility into the 
exchange rate, complicating monetary policy. Also, given the importance of maintaining 
market confidence, more volatile capital flows implies that a fall in confidence in one 
economy could quickly prompt outflows from neighbouring economies. International 
contagion remains a risk.  
Against this backdrop, Singapore’s openness to capital flows poses a challenge. Large and 
volatile capital flows could potentially cause excessive volatility in exchange rates and 
domestic liquidity conditions, leading to asset price bubbles.  
In this context, Singapore’s managed float exchange rate framework has proven robust and 
adaptable to capital flows and volatility in markets. Short-term capital flows, which can be 
highly volatile and quickly reversible, are accommodated in the first instance by the policy 
band, with the nominal exchange rate bearing most of the adjustment burden. However, if 
the capital flows were to cause undue volatility in Singapore dollar and domestic liquidity 
conditions, MAS would intervene in the foreign exchange markets and step up money market 
sterilisation operations. More stable and persistent capital inflows have typically been 
associated with periods of strong expansion in the domestic economy and these are then 
accommodated by an appropriate appreciating crawl in the policy band.  
Dealing with large capital flows and asset price bubbles cannot be the burden of monetary 
policy alone. Singapore’s experience has shown that it is effective to use targeted prudential, 
administrative, and fiscal measures to deal with asset price bubbles and mitigate the threats 
to macroeconomic and financial stability. 